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VOLUME 13 SPRING 1991 NUMBER 2
THE STATUS OF THE DIPLOMATIC BAG:
A PROPOSED UNITED STATES POSITION
Major Jeffrey F. Addicottt
"One good reason is always enough."
General R. E. Lee
I. INTRODUCTION
It is an unfortunate fact of the times that diplomatic
privileges and immunities have increasingly been subjected to
abuse by some states. The protections afforded diplomats,
diplomatic missions, and diplomatic bags have been misused to
sponsor or commit various criminal acts against other states or
their citizens, striking at the heart of traditional concepts of
international diplomatic relations.'
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1. See generally Goldberg, The Shoot-Out at the Libyan Self-Styled People's
Bureau: A Case of State-Supported International Terrorism. 30 S. DAK. L. REV.
1 (1984).
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Use of the diplomatic bag to import and export prohibited
or illegal items into receiving and transit states is of particular
concern.2 Misuse has included transport of illegal foreign cur-
rency, illegal drugs, weapons, and even human beings.3 While
all malum in se acts that abuse this diplomatic shield are objec-
tionable, most disconcerting are those which use the diplomatic
bag to facilitate acts of terrorism.' As a result, article 27(3) of
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Vienna Con-
vention),' which provides that "[t]he diplomatic bag shall not
be opened or detained,' has come under the most serious
scrutiny and debate.7 Although the article does not specifically
include the term "inviolable," it is apparent that a privileged
status has been created that is far superior to traditional
diplomatic norms.' Concerned individuals and states urge
revision of this protected status in order to better protect
legitimate security interests of receiving states. Western nations
2. Under international law a receiving state is one that receives diplomatic
materials from a sending state. A transit state can be any state through which
diplomatic materials might pass. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
opened for signature Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500
U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter Vienna Convention], which defines the international
conventions for diplomatic intercourse, privileges, and immunities of diplomatic
agents.
3. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thir-
ty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/41/10 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 ILC Report].
4. There is no universally accepted definition of terrorism, either in the
international community or in the United States. As its root word "terror" im-
plies, terrorism involves the use of fear designed to attain certain goals.
Notwithstanding that it is the antithesis of the rule of law, the old adage that
.one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" contributes to the in-
ability to carve out a clear definition. Certainly, however, Western nations have
come to associate certain specific acts as terrorism per se. Hostage taking, public
bombings, and acts directed against civilians are easily defined as terrorist in
nature, regardless of the ideological, religious, or social goals of the perpetrators.
For a more detailed discussion of the term, see R. ERICKSON, LEGITIMATE USE
OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST STATE-SPONSORED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (1989).
5. Vienna Convention, supra note 2. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations was entered into force for the U.S. on Dec. 13, 1972. The U.S. ratifi-
cation appears at 111 Cong. Rec. 23, 733 (1965).
6. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 27(3).
7. See Goldberg, supra note 1. See also E. DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW 4 (1976)
for a discussion of difficulties arising because of the approach of inviolability.
8. E. DENZA, supra note 7, at 125-26. See also GORE-BOOTH AND LORD,
SATOW'S GUIDE TO DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE 117 (5th ed. 1979) [hereinafter SATOW].
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are particularly concerned with misuse that may facilitate acts
of international terrorism. Smaller states are more concerned
with misuse that may facilitate disruptive economic or political
activities. All states fear that violence resulting from a state-
sponsored or state-supported terrorist abuse of the diplomatic
bag might precipitate not only the abolition of the diplomatic
bag's protection, but also the undermining of other privileges
and immunities codified under the Vienna Convention.'0
This Article examines the current legal status of the diplo-
matic bag and recent international efforts to re-examine that
status. Conflicts between the sending state's interest in ensur-
ing confidentiality of its diplomatic materials and the receiving
and transit states' interests in ensuring adequate security will
be closely examined. Finally, against the background of the
concept of reciprocity, a United States position on the status of
the diplomatic bag will be proposed.
II. DEFINITION OF THE DIPLOMATIC BAG AND
ITS CURRENT STATUS
A. Customary International Law
States have long required a safe and confidential means to
communicate with diplomats stationed abroad." Traditionally,
receiving states have granted foreign diplomats this privilege in
order to receive the same right of free communication. Custom-
ary international law identifies two principles which underlie
this free communication privilege: no delay and no censor-
ship.'
2
9. Several commentators seek to distinguish a "state-sponsored" terrorist act
from a "state-supported" terrorist act. State-sponsored terrorism exists when a
state directly but secretly uses its own resources to sponsor acts of terrorism
against another country. Since accountability for such acts is denied, the state
seeks to avoid responsibility. On the other hand, "state-supported" terrorism
refers to the practice of a state providing resources to a terrorist group for
training, logistics, or financing. Under the state-supported scenario, however, the
terrorist group generally operates independently from the state. See ERICKSON,
supra note 4, at 33; FM 100-37 Terrorism Counteraction, 3 (July 1987).
10. See generally Vienna Convention, supra note 2.
11. See generally H. GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE (W. Whewell
trans. 1853).
12. Id.
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It is perhaps not too much to say that the privilege of
freedom of communication is one of the most vital of
those required by and accorded to envoys. It enables
them to receive instructions from their sending State
and to send home reports of what they have done, said,
and observed. The privilege consists of the transmission
without delay of the envoy's communications and im-
munity of those communications from any form of
censorship. The communications may be sent by post or
telegraph ... [and] may also be sent by the diplomatic
bag by courier; and the courier must enjoy a degree of
freedom of movement similar to that of the ambassador
himself."
The no delay, no censorship rule extends to the courier as well
as to any physical instrument used by the courier. Over time,
the preferred instrument has come to be referred to as the
diplomatic bag. 4
Although customary international law did not specifically
prohibit inspection or refusal to approve transit of a bag,
widespread mutual respect made such occurrences rare. 5
Nevertheless, lack of universal binding rules was unsatisfactory.
An early attempt to form international consensus for a multilat-
eral treaty was initiated in 1932 at Harvard Law School. 6
13. Lyons, Personal Immunities of Diplomatic Agents, 1954 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 299, 334 (1954).
14. Some sources refer to the diplomatic bag as the diplomatic pouch. The
term diplomatic bag, however, is the description most often seen in practice and
literature.
15. E. DENZA, supra note 7, at 125-26.
16. 7 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 174-75 (1970). The
Harvard Draft Convention on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities contained
the following provisions:
1. A receiving state shall freely permit and protect official communications
by whatever available means, including the employment of messengers
provided with passports ad hoc and the use of codes and cipher:
(a) between a mission or the members of a mission and the
sending state;
(b) between a mission or the members of a mission and other
officers of the sending state upon the territory of the receiving
state;
(c) between a mission of the sending state and a mission of
another state sent to the same receiving state;
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Leading international scholars and authorities met to prepare
a proposed set of unified rules. 7 The resultant Harvard Draft
Convention on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities (Harvard
Convention) stated:
This article is based upon the principle, now gener-
ally recognized in practice, at least in times of peace,
that universal freedom of diplomatic communications is
a matter of interest to the entire community of nations.
International law recognized the principle of free-
dom of diplomatic communications at a time when the
carriage of such communications was made by special
couriers furnished with passports ad hoc. While earlier
means are still employed, at the present time interna-
tional official intercourse makes use of whatever means
are available: courier, mails, telegraph, telephone,
cable, or radio. Modern means of communication having
changed the methods of diplomatic intercourse, no
interference by the receiving state with the communica-
tions of missions . . . is tolerable. 8
Traditional customary law respected the diplomatic bag but
agreed that a receiving state, based on valid suspicion of abuse,
could either inspect or return the instrument. 19 The Harvard
Convention strongly influenced drafters of the Vienna Conven-
tion to grant the diplomatic bag additional protections previous-
ly unknown in customary law. The Harvard Research Group's
proposal actually reflected a position midway between the cus-
tomary rules of no delay, no censorship and the greater stan-
(d) between a mission of the sending state and missions and
consulates of the same state in other states;
(e) between a mission of the sending state and the agents of
public international organizations,
2. A receiving state shall freely permit and protect communications between
a mission or members of a mission of the sending state and the nationals of
the sending state within the territory of the receiving state.
3. A state other than the receiving state and the sending state shall protect




18. Id- at 175.
19. E. DENZA, supra note 7, at 125-26.
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dard of protection ultimately adopted by the Vienna Conven-
tion.
20
B. The Standard of Protection for the Diplomatic Bag
In conjunction with formation of the United Nations and
development of closer political and business ties among nations,
the international community recognized a need to codify immu-
nities and privileges associated with diplomatic relations.
Extensive debate was finally resolved in 1961 with the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. This Convention was
subsequently adopted by a majority of the United Nations
member states, including the United States.2 1
Many articles in the Vienna Convention simply codified
customary international practices long associated with interna-
tional diplomatic intercourse. An important provision was
added, however, that accorded the diplomatic bag a "more
absolute protection than was given under the previous custom-
ary law."
22
The Vienna Convention was based on a functional necessity
theory, viewing diplomatic privileges and immunities as a
means to allow proper day-to-day function of the diplomatic
mission and not as a benefit to any individual.23 Many original
commentators and drafters argued that inclusion of the shield-
ing language regarding status of the diplomatic bag strained
that analysis.24 With the bag obtaining a status of near invio-
lability, concern shifted to the vast potential for widespread
abuse. 5 It was argued that any misuse that had occurred
20. M. WHITEMAN, supra note 16, at 175.
21. Vienna Convention, supra notes 2 and 5. The Diplomatic Relations Act,
Pub. L. No. 95-393, 92 Stat. 808 (1978), adopted the Vienna Convention as the
fundamental law regarding diplomatic privileges and immunities. The Vienna
Convention was the first true multilateral agreement on diplomatic immunities
and privileges.
22. SATOW, supra note 8.
23. See generally C. E. WILSoN, DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIEs
(1967). The Vienna Convention certainly envisioned that only those protections
that were necessary to perform the functions of the diplomatic mission were to
be extended.
24. E. DENZA, supra note 7, at 126.
25. See E. CLARK, DIPLOMAT-THE WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY 103
(1979). Under customary international law, the major powers did not allow the
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under the old customary rules would surely be followed by
greater abuse under the more privileged status.
C. Article 27(3): Functional Inviolability
Two articles of the Vienna Convention, 27(3) and 27(4),
elevate the diplomatic bag's status to near inviolability. While
under customary international law the "receiving state had a
right to challenge a bag which it believed to contain unautho-
rized articles," 2 article 27(3) of the Vienna Convention states
that "f[the diplomatic bag shall not be opened or detained. 7
Part of this issue of inviolability stems from placement of
definitional language within the Vienna Convention. As reflect-
ed in the commentary accompanying article 27(4), the Interna-
tional Law Commission consciously elected to place the defini-
tional description of the bag after the broad statement of privi-
leged status in article 27(3), further stressing the principle of
absolute protection regardless of use.' All attempts to place
the definitional clause before the status clause were rejected.'
Recognition of the customary practice of detaining or in-
specting suspicious diplomatic bags can be found only in com-
mentary to articles of the Vienna Convention.' ° Even so, a
diplomatic bag for personal use. It was, however, widely acknowledged that this
was the practice. In Russia in the 1930s, "when luxuries were unobtainable,
diplomatic admirers often kept actresses and ballerinas in Paris fashions with
clothing brought into the country in the [diplomatic] bag." Id.
26. 'SATOw, supra note 8, at 117-18. See also C.E. WILSON, supra note 23,
at 136-37 (1967).
27. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 27(3).
28. See E. DENZA, supra note 7, at 126-27. This placement of the privilege
section before the content section indicated that the privilege is not conditioned
on compliance with content rules.
29. "In 1958 the Rapporteur proposed to the Cbmmission a text which
amalgamated the provisions which corresponded to paragraphs 3 and 4 of article
27. The object of this was simply to place the provision which might be said to
constitute the definition of the diplomatic bag before the provision regarding its
inviolability. This rearrangement was not acceptable to the Commission, since
it might be argued from such a juxtaposition that the inviolability of the bag
was conditional on its complying with the requirements regarding its contents."
Id-
30. The commentary to article 21 states:
The Commission has noted that the diplomatic bag has on occasion been
opened with the permission of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the receiving
State, and in the presence of a representative of the mission concerned.
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concept of absolute inviolability is not clearly delineated. Initial
formal comments of the United States included the observation
that personal baggage of a diplomat can be searched upon
serious grounds for "presuming that it contain[ed] articles not
intended for his personal use or . . . articles the import or
export of which is prohibited by law or controlled by quarantie
regulations of the receiving state."8' This analysis is not gen-
erally extended to the diplomatic bag, but Vienna Convention
language did not specifically pinpoint the concept of inviolabili-
ty.
The majority of states, in ratifying the Vienna Convention,
readily acceded to the diplomatic bag's new status and the
notion that it should not be opened or detained. A minority
position argued that language of article 27(3) did not really
mean the bag was "inviolable" because the specific term was not
included. Countries espousing this position insisted that, as a
result, the language used did not prohibit a receiving state from
exercising its security interests should the need arise.32
Other states, such as Bahrain, rejected the article and the
new status entirely, asserting that it was incompatible with
customary international law. Bahrain included a specific res-
ervation to article 27(3),33 retaining the "right to open the
diplomatic bag if there are serious grounds for presuming that
it contains articles, the import or export of which is prohibited
by law."34 Bahrain felt that protected treatment of the diplo-
matic bag was not mandatory if reason existed to believe the
While recognizing that States have been led to take such measures in
exceptional cases where there were serious grounds for suspecting that the
diplomatic bag was being used in a manner contrary to paragraph 3 of the
article, and with detriment to the interests of the receiving State, the
Commission wishes nevertheless to emphasize the over-riding importance
which it attaches to the observance of the principle of inviolability of the
diplomatic bag.
11 Y.B. OF THE INTL L. COMM'N 138 (1957).
31. C.E. WILSON, supra note 23, at 138.
32. E. DENZA, supra note 7, at 128.
33. Id. See also L. DEMBINSKI, THE LAW OF MODERN DIPLOMACY 178, n. 8
(1988). Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Libya each made such a reservation
regarding article 27(3) of the Vienna Convention. Although the United States,
the U.S.S.R., Australia, and others rejected these reservations, a state is
probably legally justified in making such a reservation if it asserts the desire
to maintain previous customary practice.
34. E. DENZA, supra note 7, at 128.
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diplomatic bag contained items either illegal or not for official
use.
35
Indeed, this analysis is included in the Convention on
Consular Relations."6 A consular bag (as opposed to a diplo-
matic bag) may be opened if authorities of the receiving state
have serious reason to believe the bag contains prohibited
items.3 The sending state then has the choice either to open
the bag or to have it returned.' However, authorities argue
this option exists only because of specific treaty provisions on
consular relations: "bags of other types of missions (such as dip-
lomatic bags) under no circumstances can be opened, or their
contents controlled by authorities of the receiving State."39
The International Law Commission has repeatedly rejected
proposals dealing with the diplomatic bag that would permit
receiving state authorities to impose a be opened or be returned
choice on sending states.4" Vhile a sending state does owe a
duty to transport only those materials consistent with article
27(4), many commentators maintain that even the "non-obser-
vance of that duty . . . [does] not create a right to inspect the
dijlomatic pouch."41
In actual international practice, states generally treat the
bag as inviolable, following the clear meaning and spirit of the
Vienna Convention. The limited protections available under
customary international practices have thus been supplanted by
a much more stringent standard that can be termed functional
inviolability.
D. Article 27(4): How Much is Enough?
Only after the diplomatic bag's status is discussed in article
27(3) does the Vienna Convention, in article 27(4), go on to de-
scribe just what constitutes the diplomatic bag: "The packages
constituting the diplomatic bag must bear visible external
35. Goldberg, supra note 1, at 4.
36. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77,
T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter Consular Convention].
37. Id. at 99, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, at 23, 596 U.N.T.S. at 290.
38. Id.
39. See L. DEMBINSKI, supra note 33, at 178.
40. E. DENZA, supra note 7, at 126-27.
41. Id. at 125.
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marks of their character and may contain only, diplomatic doc-
uments or articles intended for official use."4 2 Requirements
that the diplomatic bag "bear visible external marks" and
"contain only diplomatic documents" seldom produce much
controversy. The external mark need not even be an official
state seal of the mission.43 What has sparked controversy is
the broadly worded phrase "or articles for official use," terminol-
ogy that can only be defined by reference to actual practice
between states. Fortunately, that practice has been fairly
consistent and is instrumental in addressing two issues: (1) the
size of packages that can be placed in a diplomatic bag, and (2)
the types of articles that will qualify "for official use" under
article 27(4).
Although traditional customary international law certainly
contemplated that the diplomatic bag be of a size which could
be hand-carried, most states currently interpret the word
"article" to include objects that can only be moved with a
forklift!44 The United States has unquestionably adopted this
view,4' and is the world's leader in the shipment of huge
crates, cartons, and boxes in diplomatic bags.48 By contrast,
some states view such practices as incompatible with article
27(4) and have limited size of the package to pre-Vienna Con-
vention concepts. For example, the Communist Chinese limit
external size of the diplomatic bag to that of a hand-carried
brief case.47
A collateral issue addresses what material may be placed
in the diplomatic bag. "For official use" has not been uniformly
interpreted. The United States, along with a majority of states,
defines the phrase to include all merchandise not otherwise
restricted or illegal.41 "Official use"- merchandise is defined to
42. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 27(4).
43. E. DENZA, supra note 7, at 128.
44. M. WHITEMAN, supra note 16, at 220. A pouch is any "container, regard-
less [of] size or weight." See also E. CLARK, supra note 25, at 103. The dip-
lomatic bag "can be of any size from a small package to a lorry-load [truck-
load]."
45. United States Department of State, 5 Foreign Affairs Manual 300 (1973)
[hereinafter 5 FAM].
46. Id. at 331.8.
47. L. DEMBINSKI, supra note 33, at 177.
48. 5 FAM, supra note 45.
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"include any goods or commodities, regardless of size, form, or
value."49 Objects legitimately deemed to be "for official use"
have included "documents, office supplies, furniture for the
residence, spare parts for official cars, alcohol for receptions,
etc."
50
Some countries, primarily lesser developed ones, argue that
article 27(4) of the treaty refers only to those items traditionally
transported by means of the diplomatic bag. This perspective
would restrict the phrase to include only "official government
correspondence, documents, publications, and other materials
(including but not limited to films, magnetic tapes, plastic
plates, and cryptographic documents and equipment).""'
However, most of the international community has adopted
the United States position.52 Asserting a broad reading of
article 27(4), these states steadfastly maintain that transport of
large support-type items is essential to carry out diplomatic
relations, and therefore meets the mandates of "for official use."
Indeed, by citing apprehension over electronic surveillance and
other sophisticated forms of espionage, even ordinary building
materials used in construction projects on an embassy com-
pound might qualify for shipment through the diplomatic
bag.
53
There are, of course, limits to this expanded interpretation.
Attempts by the U.S.S.R. to use the diplomatic bag to ship
vehicles has met with mixed results.5 4 In one case focusing on
size criteria, Switzerland deemed that the Vienna Convention
did not allow the diplomatic bag to exceed a maximum weight
of 450 pounds. 5 In another case involving the Russians, the
Republic of Germany refused to recognize that a motorized
vehicle fell within the "for official use" language.56 Interesting-
49. Id. at 315.7.
50. L. DEMBINSKI, supra note 33, at 177.
51. 5 FAM, supra note 45, at 332.2-1.
52. Telephone interview with Mr. Thomas Andrews, Deputy Director,
Diplomatic Courier Service, United States Department of State (Nov. 20, 1990)
[hereinafter Andrews].
53. Ottaway, State Department, Congress in Bmbacssy Row, Wash. Post, Mar.
4, 1987, at A17, col. 2.
54. See C. ASHMAN & P. TREscorr, DIPLOMATIC CRIME 190-93 (1987).
55. Id
56. Id
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ly, in that case the Germans applied type rather than size
criteria.
If some disagreement exists over the legitimacy of items
that can be placed in the diplomatic bag, all states nevertheless
understand that prohibited items essentially conform to a list
adopted by the United States State Department: "Explosives,
firearms, ammunition, incendiary material, corrosives, caustics,
poisons, radioactive substances, magnetic materials, liquids,
illegal narcotics and dangerous drugs, . . . and any item which
is illegal to import into the receiving. country or export from the
sending state."57 Although the official position of signatories to
the Vienna Convention is that such restricted items will not be
imported or exported via the diplomatic bag, events have shown
that states do indeed transport items in violation of the plain
reading of article 27(4)."s The most common infraction in-
volves items which, while technically prohibited, are not a
malum in se violation. 9 Aside from headline-grabbing excep-
tions, such as the discovery of a kidnapped and drugged former
Nigerian official who had been sealed in a crate that was subse-
quently passed off as a diplomatic bag,6" it is reasonable to
assume that the majority of infractions are probably minor and
technical in character.
As noted, the diplomatic bag also serves as a convenient
vehicle by which a sending state can respond to any number of
exigencies. It is not difficult to postulate certain conditions that
might tempt a state to use the protection of the diplomatic bag.
For example, if an embassy is located in a country which
absolutely prohibits import of weapons, it is possible that the
sending state might determine that emergency conditions
57. 5 FAM, supra note 45, at 332.4.
58. See generally C.E. WILSON, supra note 23. In 1958, a Belgian consul gen-
eral stationed in Syria was found in Lebanon with the following items in his
car: 33 submachine guns, 28 pistols, 32 revolvers, 16 hand grenades, 1,800
rounds of machine gun ammunition, 1,500 rounds of other ammunition, several
time bombs, and some demolition equipment.
59. Id.
60. See AsHMAN & TREscoTT, supra note 54, at 204-05. In 1983, Nigerian
kidnappers had taken Mr. Dikko from his home in London and placed him,
bound and drugged, inside of a crate which they presented to British officials
at the airport as a diplomatic bag. Because of a suspicious smell emanating
from the crate and because there were no diplomatic seals or marks on the
crate, the crate was detained and opened.
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warrant protection and defense of the embassy. A policy deci-
sion might be made to ship firearms through the diplomatic
bag. Such a use of the diplomatic bag, under the given host
nation's domestic law, would be a prohibited act under the
treaty. However, the violation would not be without logical
justification if the embassy could show, for instance, a wide-
spread pattern of attacks on the diplomatic mission and an in-
ability or unwillingness of the host nation to protect the embas-
sy.
61
The dogmatic judgment that a breach is a breach, regard-
less of magnitude or motive, is not necessarily axiomatic in
light of the extremely broad language of article 27(4). While
abuses of the bag to facilitate acts of aggression can never be
justified, minor- infractions might actually serve to alleviate
conditions that would otherwise heighten conflict and strain
between sending and receiving states.
While the above scenario is only hypothetical, it would be
naive to believe that such infractions never occur, particularly
in light of various ethnocentric domestic regulations imposed by
some receiving states. 2 The critical question is whether such
malum prohibitum activities on the part of the sending state
nevertheless substantially comply with the overall intent of the
Vienna Convention.
In drafting article 27(4), the International Law Commission
recognized that the diplomatic bag had been used for transport
of items other than traditional diplomatic paperwork. Indeed,
addition of the word "article" to article 27(4) underscores the
acknowledgment that additional equipment is necessary in mod-
ern diplomatic intercourse. Ideally, a receiving state should not
institute domestic legislation that unduly restricts such items.
In the commentary to article 27(4), the Commission added:
"Where, however, the articles are intended for official use, there
61. See Kelly, American Leadership in the Middle East, U.S. Department of
State Dispatch, Sept. 1990, at 111. With the invasion of Kuwait, the American
embassy in Kuwait City remained functional despite attempts by Iraq to force
it to close. With such a cut off of food and other supplies to an embassy, the
diplomatic bag might be considered as a possible vehicle to bring in such items.
62. See generally S.H. AMIN, MIDDLE EAST LEGAL SYSTEMS (1985). As was
brought to focus by the 1990 American deployment of military forces to Saudi
Arabia, certain Middle Eastern countries prohibit the importation of non-Islamic
literature, alcoholic beverages, and pornography.
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is no objection to using the bag for transfer of currency (provid-
ed that this is not contrary to the laws or regulations of the
receiving States), medals, cipher or wireless equipment or films
or books .... ."' This caveat that bagged items should not
violate "the laws or regulations of the receiving state" must be
viewed in the light of a reasonableness standard. A receiving
state that imposes unreasonably restrictive regulations, with no
exceptions for foreign diplomats or diplomatic materials, should
probably anticipate periodic minor infractions of those rules.
To address this dilemma, some drafters of the Vienna
Convention suggested creation of a split definition based on
types of items transported. Paperwork and diplomatic mail
would always be treated as "for official use" and hence be
absolutely protected. All other materials, however, would be
subject to inspection." This proposal was rejected by the Com-
mission, 5 as were all proposals which would condition diplo-
matic protection on the propriety of a bag's contents.' The ob-
vious problem is that contents can only be verified by an
inspection.
67
Still, universal consensus remains firm that shipment of
items clearly not for official use, such as war materials to be
used in aggressive and hostile activities, can never be justified.
This consensus is in direct tension with the rule that confidenti-
ality of the bag should be respected, and that even detention of
a diplomatic bag gives rise to an appearance of wrongdoing
incompatible with the right of free diplomatic discourse. 68
While an argument may be made that a state which rejects or
detains a diplomatic bag runs the risk of being in breach of the
Vienna Convention6 9 the wording of article 27 is also suf-
ficiently broad to rebut that allegation. Unfortunately, the
Commission did not incorporate a firmer set of rules clearly
defining a violation.
63. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 27(4).
64. See Eighth Report on the Status of the Diplomatic Courier and the
Diplomatic Bag Not Accompanied by Diplomatic Courier, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/417
at 57 (1988)[hereinafter 1988 ILC Report].
65. Id.
66. E. DENZA, supra note 7, at 127.
67. Id.
68. L. DEMBINSKI, supra note 33, at 178.
69. C.E. WILSON, supra note 23.
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E. Practical Enforcement of Article 27(3) and 27(4)
Use of the diplomatic bag is much more extensive than the
ordinary person would imagine. Its value rests not only in
providing a totally secure but also a rapid means of transport,
especially for large articles.70 Most governments consider the
diplomatic bag to be indispensable for transportation of sen-
sitive material and thus a basic requirement of day-to-day
diplomatic activities.
Because the Vienna Convention failed to be more precise,
states have established through practice an expansive reading
of the "for official use" language. As a result, conflicts that arise
over the practical interpretation of article 27(4) have normally
been played out at the bilateral level. A classic example oc-
curred in early September 1986, when the Sandinista govern-
ment of Nicaragua informed the United States that only 150
kilos per week and 600 kilos per month would be permitted via
the diplomatic bag into the embassy in Managua. The Ulited
States, without a passing reference to the Vienna Convention,
simply responded in kind to the Sandinistas' weight limita-
tions.7' Exhibiting a swiftness uncharacteristic of any bureau-
cratic institution, on September 8, 1986, the Department of
State informed the Sandinistas: "[R]eciprocal restrictions will be
implemented regarding the diplomatic pouch sent to the Nicara-
guan Embassy. Effective immediately, the pouch will be limited
to 150 kilos per week and 600 kilos per month."2
Obviously, the solution from the perspective of the United
States was not to argue over the meaning of the broad language
of article 27(4). The simple answer rested, as in most matters
of international intercourse, on reciprocity. Taken to its logical
conclusion, any detention of the diplomatic bag would invite
retaliatory infringements between nations, especially antagonis-
tic ones.
70. M. WHrrEMAN, supra note 16, at 829, 830. Then Under Secretary of
State Ball noted that "hourly developments have an important bearing on our
interests . . . [and furthermore] . . .an increasing volume of routine traffic is
carried by hand through our pouch service."
71. Notice from United States Department of State to the Government of
Nicaragua (Sept. 8, 1986) (notice of reciprocal restrictions on diplomatic pouches)
[hereinafter Notice to Nicaragua].
72. Id.
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III. NONINTRUSIVE EXAMINATIONS OF
THE DIPLOMATIC BAG
As with most treaties, subsequent unforeseen events can
lead to controversy over original intent and even the plainest
of verbiage. Article 27 of the Vienna Convention is no exception.
With the advent of sophisticated technology, a most troubling
issue has arisen over the question of non-intrusive examinations
of the diplomatic bag: Is the use of electronic scanning in order
to determine contents of the diplomatic bag consistent with
language of article 27(3) that the bag shall not be "opened or
detained?"
The United States has taken the position that article 27
does not prohibit electronic scanning or other non-intrusive
examinations. Many other countries and various international
commentators also argue that nothing in the Convention pre-
vents non-intrusive tests which can be performed without
opening or detaining the diplomatic bag.74 Britain, for example,
argues that such activity is not "proscribed by a rule that [only]
forbids opening . . .. 5
The United States uses remote examination for its own
materials. Under limited circumstances and consistent with its
own internal regulations,7 such as when a diplomatic bag is
to be transported by aircraft, the United States reserves the
right to use electronic scanning, X-ray, and various bomb de-
tectors on outgoing American material. Indeed, many American
73. Andrews, supra note 52. But see Department of State Memorandum from
the Deputy Legal Advisor for Administration (Lyerly) to the Office of Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs (Vaughan) (May 16, 1965).
"[C]ommunications . . . when properly marked, will be permitted to proceed
without examination of any sort." Id.
74. SATOW, supra note 8, at 117. "[A] receiving state or the airline au-
thorities may subject a bag to detector devices . . . since this does not involve
opening or detaining it . . .." Id.
75. L. DEMBINSKI, supra note 33, at 192. The next issue, however, would be
to define a course of action to deal with a violation. "In any event, even if such
screening was able to disclose the possibility of the misuse there would be a
problem what then to do, as the United Kingdom made no such reservation .
• . when it signed the treaty. So the position remains unclear and for that
reason unsatisfactory."
76. 5 FAM, supra note 45, at 332.4.
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commercial airlines will not accept luggage for transport unless
it has been scanned by airport security systems.
Nevertheless, the United States has made it clear that it
does not perform such remote examinations on diplomatic bags
of other nations.7 7 Officially, the United States refuses to en-
gage in scanning because electronic examinations are regarded
as threats to the security and confidentiality of the bag's con-
tents.78 However, motivation for this position probably stems
primarily from the principle of reciprocity. If the United States
initiated scanning procedures for foreign diplomatic bags, it
could reasonably expect a response in kind7 9 which would be
unacceptable. Thus, to protect its interests as a sender of
diplomatic materials via the diplomatic bag, the United States
as a receiving state does not engage in scanning." One attor-
ney before the House of Representatives noted that "national
security interests outweigh any interest the U.S. government
would have in searching the pouch [diplomatic bag] of another
nation."8 '
The United States Department of State has therefore also
categorically asserted that no United States diplomatic bags
may be scanned by officials of any foreign country.8 2 Should a
foreign state attempt to scan a United States diplomatic bag,
the diplomatic courier is instructed to return the bag to the
United States.8" Furthermore, if it were discovered that a
foreign nation had scanned a diplomatic bag unaccompanied by
a courier, the United States would immediately issue a formal
77. Andrews, supra note 52.
78. Telephone interviews with Mr. Bruce Rashkow, Assistant Legal Advisor
for U.N. Affairs, Office of the Legal Advisor, United States Department of State
(Nov. 20 and Dec. 13, 1990)[hereinafter Rashkow].
79. Report to the Subcommittee on International Operations of the Committee
on Foreign Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives on Bill H.R. 3036, Revi-
sion of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 143
(1988) (Statement of Steven J. Stein, Chairman of the Committee on Internation-
al Law, Association of the Bar of the City of New York). "Any measure em-
ployed in this country against the pouch of another nation would almost
certainly be employed against the U.S. pouch."
80. Rashkow, supra note 78.
81. Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 344 (1987).
82. Id.
88. Id.
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protest to that government, even though unaccompanied diplo-
matic bags never contain sensitive items.' Though not always
reduced to writing, this policy has been adopted by all other
major nations of the world community.8 5
Although the United States feels article 27(3) does not
actually prohibit electronic scanning, some nations regard its
use as a constructive opening and thus a breach of the Vienna
Convention.8 6 The Bulgarian Special Rapporteur at the Inter-
national Law Commission stated that "any technique for finding
out what is in the bag is in breach of the spirit of the Arti-
cle. "B
By contrast, many smaller countries which transport little
by way of the bag might welcome the possibility of remote
examination. Since many lesser developed states have only two
missions, one in Washington and one in Moscow, they obviously
have more to gain than more diplomatically active states. This
argument, of course, assumes that the lesser developed nations
possess the budget to purchase necessary scanning equipment.
In the final analysis, it is not necessarily true that even
those nations which refuse to engage in scanning, either on
practical grounds or from a belief that this would violate the
Vienna Convention, have something illegal to hide. Remote
electronic examination could reveal new cryptographic devices
or other confidential materials which constitute legitimate state
secrets. In such a case, external examination techniques might
well be tantamount to an opening.' In fact, it is likely that
sophisticated technology could be developed that would make it
possible to read documents inside the diplomatic bag.
One proposed option requires that a receiving state first
request a sending state to permit scanning of a suspicious
diplomatic bag. It can be argued that this additional require-
ment would effectively eliminate unilateral scanning, and would
be more consistent with current provisions of the Vienna Con-
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 1988 ILC Report, supra note 64, at 20.
87. L. DEMBINSKI, supra note 33, at 192.
88. See E. DENZA, supra note 7, at 126-27.
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vention.89 The impact on the concept of inviolability would
therefore be less egregious.
However, any detraction from the privileged status of the
diplomatic bag necessarily renders a blow to the concept of free
diplomatic communications. Any practice involving remote
examination procedures could make a "serious inroad into the
principle of inviolability. . . . [F]reedom of communications
remains a cardinal principle in relations among nations, and
notwithstanding some instances of abuse, it needs to be pre-
served and safeguarded in the interest of all states."90
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION
Recognizing the need for a firmer set of universal rules to
address the issues of potential abuse of the diplomatic bag and
non-intrusive examinations, the international community is once
again examining the possibility of creating a new protocol. 9' In
1986, United States Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
urged that the entire doctrine of diplomatic immunity be limit-
ed.92 Arguing that state-sponsored terrorists were too fre-
quently immunized by the doctrine, particularly when misuses
involved smuggling of weapons, Weinberger called upon "diplo-
mats, with the assistance of the legal profession" to define new
89. Id.
90. SEN, A DIPLOMAT'S HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE
135-36 (1988).
91. 1988 ILC Report, supra note 64, at 10, 11. Guidance for the Internation-
al Law Commission was set out in a Preliminary Report to the Fortieth Session:
It is hoped that such a comprehensive approach would reflect more adequate-
ly the significant developments that have taken place since the 1961 Vienna
Convention. Diplomatic law in all its facets has acquired new forms and new
dimensions because of the ever increasing dynamics of international relations
in which States and international organizations are involved in very active
contacts through various means.... The increasing number of violations of
the diplomatic law, some of which have raised public concern, also warrant
such a comprehensive and coherent regulation of the status of all types of
official . . . bags. In this way, all means of communication for official
purposes through official couriers and bags would enjoy the same degree of
international legal protection.
Id.
92. Address by Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, American Bar
Association National Conference on Law in Relation to Terrorism (June 5, 1986)
[hereinafter Weinberger Speech].
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limits to help solve problems of diplomatic privileges being
extended to those states connected with terrorists.
3
Between 1986 and 1988, these concerns became a domestic
issue within the United States. The Senate94 and the House
of Representatives 5 conducted hearings on several proposed
bills addressing this issue. Special attention was focused on
language of the Vienna Convention addressing the diplomatic
bag.' Although none of these bills was enacted into law, the
Congressional sessions provided a forum for public examination
of the diverse legal and political ramifications associated with
limiting privileges and immunities currently vested in the
diplomatic bag.
Congressman Stephen Solarz sponsored a House of Repre-
sentatives bill urging Presidential review of "the treatment
accorded to diplomatic pouches [bags] under the Vienna Con-
vention."97 Solarz sought to curtail inviolability of the diplo-
matic bag by suggesting that, under certain circumstances
involving security considerations based on probable cause, an
examination of the bag would be proper.9" Solarz and others
eventually deferred to the State Department for evaluation of
legitimate security concerns relating to the diplomatic bag.
99
At the international level, as early as 1976 the United
Nations General Assembly passed a formal resolution" ask-
ing the International Law Commission (Commission) to prepare
a draft proposal for a protocol addressing "the status of the
diplomatic courier and of the diplomatic bag not accompanied
93. Id.
94. Diplomatic Crimes Legislation, 1987: Hearings on S. 969 Before the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 342 (1987).
95. The Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act, 1988: Hearings on H.R.
3036 Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Operations of the House of Representatives
Comm. on For. Affairs, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 142 (1988).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Thorny Issue: Peeking into a Privileged Pouch, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1988,
at B6, col. 3.
99. Telephone interview with Philip Robertson, Aide to Representative
Stephen Solarz, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs (Aug. 23, 1990).
100. G.A. Res. 31/76, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39) at 181, U.N. Doc. A/31/39
(1976).
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by a courier."'' In July 1986, after lengthy discussions, the
International Law Commission provided a set of draft articles
to the United Nations General Assembly on the "status of the
diplomatic courier and the diplomatic bag not. accompanied by
diplomatic courier.
" 10 2
These provisionally adopted draft articles contained certain
bracketed portions in the text, reflecting a general inability to
reach a consensus. The desire to obtain a full range of com-
ments from the states, however, was certainly achieved. The
1986 draft contained two main provisions in regard to the
diplomatic bag. Draft article 28(1) provided: "The diplomatic bag
shall [be inviolable wherever it may be; it shall] not be opened
or detained [and shall be exempt from examination directly or
through electronic or other technical device]."0 3 Draft article
28(2) provided:
Nevertheless, if competent authorities of the receiving
[or the transit] State have serious reasons to believe
that the [consular] bag contains something other than
the correspondence, documents or articles referred to in
article 25, they may request [that the bag be subjected
to examination through electronic or other technical
devices. If such examination does not satisfy the com-
petent authorities of the receiving [transit] State, they
may further request] that the bag be opened in their
presence by an authorized representative of the sending
State. If [either] [this] request is refused by the author-
ities of the sending State, the competent authorities of
the receiving [or the transit] State may require that
the bag be returned to its place of origin.'0
4
This 1986 draft of article 28(1) presented a choice for
establishing the degree of protection to be given the diplomatic
bag. If the first bracketed material were read into article 28(1)
then the "diplomatic bag would be given a clearer status, if not
a greater degree of protection, than found under the current
Vienna Convention. This reading could curtail the concept of
101. Id.
102. 1986 ILO Report, supra note 3.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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inviolability. by providing that if a receiving state has serious
reason to believe that the diplomatic bag contains prohibited
items, it may request "that the bag be opened in their presence
by [a] . .. representative of the sending State.""5 The option
of sending the diplomatic bag back to the sending state is also
set forth, as is the option for the receiving state to request that
the bag be electronically scanned.
Should the second set of bracketed material also be includ-
ed, however, the diplomatic bag would unquestionably be
elevated to a status of absolute inviolability. This reading would
reflect the view that the diplomatic bag should be free from any
form of detention or inspection whatsoever, regardless of the
circumstances. Such a definition would clearly present a tre-
mendous obstacle to legitimate and pressing security interests
of a receiving state.
As anticipated, when these draft articles were forwarded to
the respective governments for observations and sugges-
tions,I°6 responses were as mixed as the proffered proposals.
For example, some states argued that electronic scanning
should be allowed only for those items "which are not intended
for official use only and which heavily endanger either the
public security of the receiving or transit State or the safety of
individuals." °7 Other states simply wished to "adopt the text
of paragraph 1 without brackets and to delete altogether para-
graph 2."1°8 In addition, some indicated that treatment given
to consular bags under article 35(3)109 should be extended to
diplomatic bags.
Comments from responding states focused on five key
concerns:" 0 (1) Inviolability; (2) non-intrusive scanning; (3)
need for a uniform approach to definition of all types of bags,
with particular attention given to the consular bag; (4) whether
uniform treatment of all types of bags, if adopted, should be
governed by article 27(3) of the Vienna Convention on Diplo-
matic Relations, or by article 35(3) of the Consular Convention;
105. Id.
106. See L. DEMBINSKI, supra note 33, at 176.
107. 1988 ILC Report, supra note 64, at 59.
108. Id. at 60.
109. Consular Convention, supra note 36.
110. 1988 ILC Report, supra note 64, at 57.
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and (5) whether a transit state should possess the same rights
as a receiving state in regard to the diplomatic bag."' Com-
ments received from world governments reflected vastly dif-
ferent views of a redraft of article 27.
In 1989 after extensive evaluation of these comments at its
fortieth"2 and forty-first sessions,"13 the Commission pre-
sented a second reading of the draft articles to the United
Nations General Assembly. The 1989 draft contains three
separate options, and eliminates the brackets of the 1986
version. This second reading is still under evaluaion. 1 Article
28 (alternative A) provides: "The diplomatic bag shall be invio-
lable wherever it may be; it shall not be opened or detained
and shall be exempt from examination directly or through
electronic or other technical devices."" i5
This alternative clearly elevates the diplomatic bag to a
status of unquestionable inviolability, specifically restricting any
attempts at remote examination. While article 27(3) of the
Vienna Convention strongly suggests that the diplomatic bag
enjoys complete immunity, no multilateral convention has ever
used the word "inviolable" in connection with the diplomatic
bag. Draft article 28 (alternative A) reflects the view that the
diplomatic bag should be afforded the same status as "the
archives and documents of the mission and of diplomatic corre-
spondence.""' Alternative A, then, "does not strike the neces-
sary balance between the confidentiality of the bag. and the
security and other legitimate interests of the receiving state or
the transit state.""
7
Draft article 28 (alternative B) reads:
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See Draft Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of
its Forty-First Session, Chapter II, Status of the Diplomatic Courier and the
Diplomatic Bag Not Accompanied by Diplomatic Courier, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.
435/Add. 2 (1989).
114. Telephone interview with Vladimar Kotliar, Secretary, International Law
Commission, United Nations (Nov. 1, 1990). This second reading has been
returned by the General Assembly to the Commission for additional study and
comment. See also Andrews, supra note 52.
115. 1988 ILC Report, supra note 64, at 63.
116. Id. at 62.
117. Id.
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1. The diplomatic bag shall be inviolable wherever
it may be, it shall not be opened or detained and shall
be exempt from examination directly or through elec-
tronic or other technical devices.
2. Nevertheless, if the competent authorities of the
receiving State or the transit State have serious reason
to believe that the consular bag contains something
other than the correspondence, and documents or arti-
cles, referred to in article 25, they may request that
the bag be opened in their presence by an authorized
representative of the sending State. If this request is
refused by the authorities of the sending State, the bag
shall be returned to its place of origin."1
Alternative B adds a second paragraph, wherein treatment
accorded consular bags is adopted. Since the use of consular
bags has become obsolete in modern international practice, this
provision is blatantly nonresponsive to the issue of developing
a viable option for the receiving or transit state.
Draft article 28 (alternative C) reads:
1. The diplomatic bag shall be inviolable wherever
it may be, it shall not be opened or detained and shall
be exempt from examination directly or through elec-
tronic or other technical devices.
2. Nevertheless, if the competent authorities of the
receiving State or the transit State have serious reason
to believe that the bag contains something other than
the correspondence, and documents or articles, referred
to in article 25, they may request that the bag be
opened in their presence by an authorized representa-
tive of the sending State. If this request is refused by
the authorities of the sending State, the bag shall be
returned to its place of origin.
1 9
Alternative C of draft article 28 corresponds most closely
with the first reading offered by the Commission in 1986, if the
brackets are excluded. 2 0 While the receiving state would not
118. Id.
119. Id. at 64.
120. 1986 ILC Report, supra note 3, art. 27(2). Article 27(2) states:
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have unilateral authority to examine the diplomatic bag, it
could require that the diplomatic bag be returned to its place
of origin.
Because alternative C appears to establish at least some
semblance of balance between protection of confidentiality of the
diplomatic bag and legitimate security interests of a receiving
state, it has attracted numerous supporters. In fact, it is noth-
ing more than a compromise.
The greatest problem with this alternative is the latitude
afforded a receiving state to demand inspection. This problem
was duly noted during the first reading and has been subse-
quently noted in every debate on the matter. The Commission
pointed out that "the [receiving] State's opening [of] the diplo-
matic bag on presumption of unlawful content of the bag might
be motivated by an attempt to breach the confidentiality of the
bag's content."'2 '
Healthy skepticism of the scanning and inspection proposal
embodied in alternative C is understandable. Although states
"were fully conscious of the dangers of abuse . . . they were
even more aware that any right of search could be abused by
officials claiming to have grounds to suspect any bag which they
wished to investigate." 2 ' One must therefore seriously consid-
er whether the cure may be more harmful to the general con-
cept of adequate diplomatic relations than the problem itself.
A consistent goal of the Commission, in all its proposals,
has been to establish a set of rules reconciling the desires of a
sending state to maintain absolute confidentiality of its diplo-
matic materials with legitimate security demands of a receiving
state. This goal has not yet been realized, as evident by the
Nevertheless, if competent authorities of the receiving [or the transit] State
have serious reasons to believe that the [consular] bag contains something
other than the correspondence, documents or articles referred to in article 25,
they may request [that the bag be subjected to examination through electron-
ic or other technical devices. If such examination does not satisfy the
competent authorities of the receiving [transit] State, they may further
request] that the bag be opened in their presence by an authorized represen-
tative of the sending State. If [either] [this] request is refused by the
authorities of the sending State, the competent authorities of the receiving




122. SATOW, supra note 8.
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three alternatives.'23 Continued inability of the Commission
to set forth even a single draft clearly reflects the tremendous
complexities in trying to balance these two diametrically op-
posed issues. The diplomatic bag is either inviolable, or it is
something less.
V. REcIPROCITY
Perhaps the most widely publicized abuse of the diplomatic
bag to date, clearly illustrating the controversy over the bag's
status, was committed by the Libyan government of Colonel
Qaddafi.' 4 In April of 1984, two Libyans gunned down eleven
demonstrators and one British constable as they stood outside
of the Libyan Embassy in London.2 ' Despite substantial sus-
picions that weapons and other evidence connected with this
outright act of terrorism were put inside of Libyan diplomatic
bags, British authorities allowed the Libyans to carry diplomatic
bags out of the country without searching or scanning
them.'26 Officially, Britain's position was that the Libyans and
their diplomatic bags were protected by the Vienna Convention.
Article 27(3) was interpreted to provide the diplomatic bag with
an inviolable status.
Some commentators, however, charged that British authori-
ties refused to search or detain the diplomatic bag to avoid
further international political conflict with Libya and other
radical Arab elements.'27 Indeed, Britain's only affirmative act
was to break off diplomatic relations with Libya.
Following the incident, the Foreign Affairs Committee of
the United Kingdom House of Commons conducted a detailed
study of the crime and considered, among other issues, the legal
protection that should be accorded the diplomatic bag."~ De-
123. 1986 ILC Report, supra note 3, at 8.
124. It is well known that Libya has not hesitated to finance, support and
even direct several acts of terrorism against various Western powers. See Green,
International Law and the Control of Terrorism, 7 DAL oUsIE L.J. 236, 247
(1983).
125. Nordheimer, Gunmen in London in Libyan Embassy Fire Into Crowd,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1984, at Al, col. 6.
126. Goldberg, supra note 1, at 4.
127. Id.
128. H.C. Foreign Affairs Committee, First Report, The Abuse of Diplomatic
Immunities and Privileges, Report with an Annex; Together with the Proceedings
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spite tremendous public outcry and stringent calls for amend-
ment of the Vienna Convention to prevent recurrence of such
notorious criminal acts, the committee rejected all such argu-
ments.
Because the committee felt that protections afforded by the
Vienna Convention were absolutely necessary to British diplo-
matic functions, it recommended, that no action be taken to
alter the Vienna Convention; the diplomatic bag should retain
its current status of inviolability. 2 9 "In respect of all these
matters we were constantly reminded of the importance of
reciprocity .... "130 The benefits of reciprocity rendered any
other conclusion totally self-defeating.''
Indeed, the desire to clarify a status for the diplomatic bag
must always rest upon this cornerstone of reciprocity. Nations
demanding inspection of even the most suspicious diplomatic
bags must do so at the risk of having their-own bags subjected
to the same process by the sending state.'32 Such practice
would quickly undermine the entire concept of free diplomatic
intercourse.
In the modern world, hardly a single state has not ex-
changed diplomats with another, each aware that its represen-
tatives will receive the same treatment given to diplomats of
the other state.' The United States alone has over one hun-
of the Committee; Minutes of Evidence Taken on 20 June and 2 and 8 July in
the Last Session of Parliament, and Appendices (Dec. 12, 1984) [hereinafter H.C.
Foreign Affairs Committee], quoted in, Comment, The Abuse of the Diplomatic
Privileges and Immunities: Recent United Kingdom Experience, 79 AM. J. INT'L
L. 641, 642, n. 5 (1985)."
129. Id.
130. Id. at 650.
131. Id. at 651.
132. Nelson, Opening Pandora's Box: The Status of the Diplomatic Bag in
International Relations, 12 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 494 (1989).
133. Miller, Terrorism and Hostage Taking: Lessons From the Iranian Crisis,
13 RuTGERS L.J. 513 (1982). One clear illustration of the reciprocity concept
exists from an incident that occurred in 1940 between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. On
January 5, 1940, Soviet authorities cut off long distance phone service from the
U.S. embassy in Moscow. On January 10, 1940, President Roosevelt commented
to the Secretary of State "I am wondering whether we might apply the same
rule to the Russian Embassy ... " On January 20, 1940, the American
embassy's long distance service was restored. See M. WHwrEMAN, supra note 16,
at 182, 183.
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dred fifty embassies throughout the world."M Regardless of
the vagueness of articles 27(3) and (4), all nations understand
that reciprocity is a crucial element in any discussion of the
diplomatic bag. Britain understood that if it had reacted to the
Libyan incident by implementing procedures to scan the diplo-
matic bags of other countries, British diplomatic bags would
also be scanned. The only real guarantee that nations, friendly
or otherwise, will adhere to international rules and comply with
concepts of diplomatic immunity rests in the concept of reciproc-
ity.
VI. JUST A MATTER OF TIME?
It is unknown whether the United States would approach
a Libyan type incident with the same "stiff upper lip" shown by
the British. Crisis-oriented demands for action might very well
require adoption of hastily drafted rules that could be detrimen-
tal to any reasonable form of diplomatic intercourse or other
established procedures.
One example can be seen in the United States response to
the terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie,
Scotland."3 5 Responding to public outcry, President Bush
quickly appointed a bipartisan Commission on Aviation Security
and Terrorism to investigate and make specific recommenda-
tions to avoid future terrorist incidents. The Commission's
findings, however, .underscore the need to carefully and slowly
reach logical and workable conclusions.
The Commission overreacted and issued sixty detailed
recommendations, many critical of established procedures and
agencies. The Federal Aviation Agency, the State Department,
Pan Am, and the Science Applications International Corporation
(SAIC) were all singled out for criticism." 6 Demands for re-
134. Rashkow, supra note 78.
135. On December 21, 1988, a "semtex" bomb exploded on board Pan Am
flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. This act of terrorism resulted in the deaths
of all 259 passengers and 11 persons on the ground. See President's Panel
Reports on Terrorism, Aviation Security, 12 L. & NAT'L SEC. INTELLIGENCE REP.
6 (June 1990).
136. Id. at 5. The report recommended that the Federal Aviation Agency sus-
pend plans to require airlines to spend funds on thermal neutron analysis (TNA)
bomb detecting devices manufactured by SAIC. The Commission found that more
technological research should be done. Pan Am was criticized for its security
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forms to established procedures in all these institutions were
not well received by those targeted for change. Indeed, all those
targeted argued that such changes were unnecessary and, in
the context of providing quality service and security, would do
more harm than good.'37 The Commission also responded with
a typical call for Congress to "enact legislation to create a
position of Assistant Secretary of Transportation for Security
and Intelligence.""
One can only surmise that, had the bomb been hidden in
an unaccompanied diplomatic bag placed on board the aircraft,
recommendations would have included abolition of the priv-
ileged status of the diplomatic bag under current article 27.
Indeed, it is possible that a diplomatic bag will be used in such
an incident.
This possibility, coupled with an already uncertain future
status of the diplomatic bag, compels the United States to
establish a concrete policy that will take into account inevitable
public fervor surfacing after any headline-grabbing use of the
diplomatic bag. The United States response to a state-sponsored
abuse of the diplomatic bag must not be such that principles
essential to open diplomatic communication are abrogated. It is
clear that most abuses of the bag are not related to acts of
terrorism, and many nations have probably misused the bag at
one time or another. Accordingly, international and United
States calls for any changes in rules that protect the bag's
status must be tempered with a hard look at the overall impact
of such changes on the integrity of international diplomacy and
United States interests.
A. Abuses of the Bag
Illegal smuggling of "currency, jewels, watches, drugs,
bombs, etc., is only one of the problems faced by customs
officials when dealing with privilege-abusing diplomats. Officials
procedures and the State Department for various aspects of its counter-terrorism
initiatives.
137. Id. The SAIC characterized the report as being flawed. Pan Am respond-
ed that 'before, during and after the crisis, we put forth every effort humanly
possible." The State Department related that it was fully capable of responding
to any and all known terrorist attacks.
138. Id.
249
250 HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 13:221
must also police the import (in bulk lots) of propaganda sup-
porting a rival political ideology.""3 9
The most serious forms of misuse have certainly revolved
about the business of spying. It has long been recognized that
the provisions of the Vienna Convention offer perfect refuge to
this type of illegal activity. "The embassy building is immune
from raid or search and houses radio and cipher facilities. And
the diplomatic bag provides a safe and regular means of com-
municating documents and the money to pay agents they




Employment of the bag as a weapon of war began in the
mid-1970s when it became obvious that some embassies and
missions used it to smuggle various firearms. 42 Potential use
of the diplomatic bag for acts of aggression and violence created
widespread international consternation. With the unification of
Germany, the depth of actual abuses is only now being realized.
Revelations of such abuses of diplomatic privileges by the
former East German government have been astonishing.
43
Abuses have included use of false diplomatic credentials and
use of the diplomatic bag to smuggle weapons and currency.
Although state-supported terrorism clearly contravenes all
fundamental concepts of international law,' 44 allegations have
been made that Soviet Bloc countries, as well as countries such
as Libya, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Cuba, have been active in
supporting and sponsoring acts of violence against governments
they wish to harm. 45 Since conventional warfare is deemed
to be less useful, some view state-sponsored terrorism as the
new modus operand i 46 for low intensity conflicts. 47 Indeed,
139. L. DEMBINSKI, supra note 33, at 192.
140. E. CLARK, supra note 25, at 191.
141. Id. at 189-91.
142. C.E. Wilson, supra note 23, at 137.
143. Watson, Combatting Terrorism Teaching Update, U.S. ARMY COMMAND
AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE (1990).
144. See generally Murphy, Legal Controls and the Deterrence of Terrorism:
Performance and Prospects, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 465, 491 (1982).
145. Weinberger Speech, supra note 92.
146. Legislation to Combat International Terrorism: Hearings on H. Res. 223;
H. Con. Res. 339; H.R. 5612; H.R. 5613; and H.R. 6311 Before the Committee
on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific
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if terrorism can be proven to be state-sponsored, it is an act of
war. It is critical in such a case to clearly establish the linkage.
While it may be argued that one man's terrorist is another
man's freedom fighter, the fact that an individual uses a diplo-
matic bag to commit or secrete aggressive criminal activities
renders that issue moot. When the diplomatic bag is misused in
such a manner, it is imperative that emphasis be placed on the
criminal act, not on possible motives for the act. It is clear that
the diplomatic bag, by treaty and customary international law,
should not be used to facilitate open attacks on the people and
property of another state. Any such use to facilitate acts of
violence for ideological ends can only be categorized as a ter-
rorist act.
B. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Abuses
Ordinary terrorist acts pale when Compared to current fears
that the diplomatic bag might be used to transport weapons of
mass destruction. Beyond the normal range of statesponsored
terrorism that includes hijackings, bombings, and kidnappings,
there looms the unthinkable threat of nuclear, biological, or
chemical (NBC) terrorism. In the context of the large scale
destruction that could result from even a single NBC event,
demands for security safeguards would seem to far outweigh
any status quo that the rules might seek to maintain, let alone
calls for inviolability.
If ordinary weapons can be neatly and easily sent into the
receiving state via the diplomatic bag, so can a weapon of mass
destruction.14 "[A]s it now stands, a hostile country could
Affairs and on International Operations, 98th Cong. Sess. 33 (1984) (statement
of Brian M. Jenkins, Director of the Security and Subnational Conflict Program,
The Rand Corp.).
147. Dep't of Army & Dep't of Air Force, FIELD MANUAL 100-20, MILITARY OP-
ERATIONS IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT 14 (Dec. 1989). The term "low intensity
conflict" is defined as:
Political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below
conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states.
It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and
ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed
force. It is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic,
informational, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are often
localized, generally in the Third World, but contain certain regional and
global security implications.
Id.
148. Some commentators argue that a terrorist group would never use such
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smuggle in an atomic bomb, piece by piece, then reassemble it
for use when desired."'49 Of course, with the current inter-
pretation of article 27(4) as to size of diplomatic bags, the entire
weapon could probably be passed through a single diplomatic
bag.
The central argument of those who desire a restriction on
privileges associated with the diplomatic bag rests with the
specter of an act that would cause us all to "go up in smoke
since diplomatic bags could be used to secrete [nuclear] weap-
ons." 5 ° Such arguments appeal to emotion rather than to
intellect; nevertheless, they are compelling. Debasing the privi-
leged status of the diplomatic bag, however, is not the answer
for two reasons.
First, a determined terrorist will find yet another way to
smuggle weapons. Second, since nations have an inherent right
of self-defense to search out and otherwise protect themselves
against viable threats to their national security, the state
sponsoring such blatant aggressive behavior takes an inordinate
risk by using the diplomatic bag in such a manner.1 51 It is
one thing for a diplomat to smuggle drugs for his own profit; it
is quite another to use the bag to ship illegal weapons designed
for aggressive acts.
It is impossible that restrictions on the use of the diplomat-
ic bag will eliminate such an event. In an open society such as
the United States, the state-sponsored terrorist need not rely on
the bag. Necessary materials can be obtained on the domestic
open market and, more importantly, will not leave a "signature"
that can be traced. Given the concept of reciprocity, elimination
of current protections will hurt the open society more than the
terrorist and his sponsors.
weapons, since world opinion would condemn them. It is also thought that the
primary utility of such weapons is to threaten, not to actually detonate. See
Wilder, International Terrorism and Hostage Taking: An Overview, 11 MANITOBA
L.J. 367, 372-73 (1981).
149. C.E. WILsON, supra note 23, at 137, 138.
150. Goldberg, supra note 1, at 4.
151. See Rose v. King, 3 D.L.R. 618, 646-47 (Quebec, King's Bench, Appeal
Side 1947) cited in 7 M. Whiteman, supra note 16, at 181: "Before granting or
recognizing a privilege to another State, a State has the right to accord to itself
a first privilege, that of its own security."
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VII. A PROPOSAL FOR A UNITED STATES POSITION
A. Cost-Benefit Analysis
A primary obligation of any state is to protect its citizens
from external as well as internal harm. Formulation of a
United States position regarding the International Law Comm-
ission's latest set of alternatives for draft article 28 must take
into account the occasional abuse of the diplomatic bag. Howev-
er, a greater consideration lies with the possibility that* the
United States might lose an essential vehicle for shipping
confidential articles into foreign nations.
While abuses of the diplomatic bag are likely to continue,
it is unlikely that the bag will be used in an NBC event. The
principle cost of the bag's protected status is in the realm of
espionage and an occasional spectacular abuse such as that
sustained by the British in the 1984 Libyan incident. It is also
obvious that the diplomatic bag is a critical tool in carrying out
United States foreign policy, and this benefit rests primarily on
the concept of inviolability.
Instead of arguing for a weaker status for the diplomatic
bag, the United States must demand that the current status set
out in articles 27(3) and (4) be strengthened. There must be no
doubt that the diplomatic bag is inviolable. The United States
should unequivocally endorse draft article 28 (alternative A),
rendering the diplomatic bag absolutely inviolable wherever it
may be.
Those attracted to draft article 28 (alternative C), because
it offers a "reimplementation of what was the customary inter-
national practice with regard to the diplomatic bag [by] intro-
duc[ing] the most appropriate balance between the opposing
interests of the sending and receiving states"'52 fail to ap-
preciate the tremendous negative impact such a rule would
have on United States interests: While it may be that alterna-
tive C "augments the sending and receiving states' common in-
terest in tranquil and efficient foreign relations,"'53 such an
analysis furthers the international perspective, not the United
States perspective.
152. Nelson, supra note 132, at 520.
153. Id.
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Since the United States has established diplomatic missions
in almost every nation in the world and is by far the greatest
sender of the diplomatic bag,' 54 it is reasonable that the Unit-
ed States should support the continued privileged status of the
diplomatic bag and reject any efforts to scan or search it. The
fact that the United States also receives more incoming diplo-
matic communications than any nation 55 does not outweigh
the need to have a protected means to transport diplomatic
materials throughout the world. Just as the British concluded
that the need for a protected diplomatic bag outweighed terror-
ist abuses, the United States must reach the same conclusion.
Those who argue that abuses of the diplomatic bag cannot
be ignored have failed to weigh the most critical balancing
factor of all-United States interests in having an inviolable
instrument. The price of this inviolability is tolerance of occa-
sional abuses; the fulcrum must still shift towards the over-
riding need for a truly inviolable diplomatic bag.
B. Dealing With the Abuser of the Diplomatic Bag
An alternative method for dealing with a known state-
supported terrorist abuse of the diplomatic bag is to seek
redress financially, judicially, or militarily.'56 If a criminal
commits a crime with a gun, the objective person does not seek
revocation of the constitutional right to bear arms;157 he de-
mands that the criminal be punished. Likewise, if a state uses
the diplomatic bag to commit acts of violence, one should not
call for the elimination of fundamental diplomatic privileges;
rather, he should demand that the renegade state be punished
in a legitimate forum. The central focus then shifts to discover-
ing an appropriate forum for punishment of the abuser.
One very valid criticism of international law is that all
dispute resolution requires involvement of some third party.
This criticism is particularly appropriate when examining
154. Andrews, supra note 52.
155. Id. The United Nations is headquartered in New York. In addition,
Washington is host to more foreign missions than any other nation in the world.
156. A prime example of the use of force to counter state-sponsored terrorism
occurred on April 14, 1986 when the United States conducted bombing strikes
on various targets in Libya. This was in response to the Libyan ordered bomb-
ing of a discotheque in West Berlin on April 5, 1986.
157. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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abuses of the diplomatic bag. Certainly, however, legitimate and
effective tools exist under customary international law that can
permit punishment of an abuser of the diplomatic bag on a
unilateral basis.
First, an aggrieved state could rely on the classical concept
of retorsion, taking all those legal acts necessary to exhibit its
disapproval of the offending state. Actions could include recall
of diplomatic personnel from the offending state or expulsion of
diplomatic personnel of the offending state. Additionally, the
aggrieved state could implement acts of sequestration such as
economic, social, or political sanctions against the offending
state.
Second, an aggrieved state could certainly suspend portions
of the Vienna Convention in order to respond to the illegal
behavior. If the breach by the offending state could be catego-
rized as a material breach, such a suspension would be entirely
consistent with international norms.
Finally, the aggrieved state could turn to classical forms of
self-defense, depending on the severity of the abuse. Realistical-
ly, if authorities of a receiving state had hard evidence that a
diplomatic bag was used to transport objects clearly malum in
se, it is reasonable to assume that this aggrieved state would
make a policy decision to search the diplomatic bag. Under
traditional notions of self-defense and forcible self-help, a
national entity will do what is necessary to protect itself from
acts of violence.' In this context, if an abuse were discov-
ered, the classical right to engage in an act of reprisal, taking
an action that would otherwise be illegal, might be appropriate.
This option would be of fundamental value if the abuse had led
to an act of violence. The aggrieved state would, of course, have
to meet the basic criteria associated with an act of reprisal: (1)
the response must be proportionate to that complained of; (2)
the reprisal must be timely; (3) the reprisal cannot be directed
158. The right of a country to engage in acts of self-defense is well known
in international law. The famous Caroline Doctrine, which defines the cir-
cumstances that permit forcible self-help, grew out of an 1837 raid by Canadian
troops into New York. In response, Secretary of State Daniel Webster set down
the rules for such acts of self-defense. He indicated that a nation may resort to
necessary and proportional acts of self-defense if such acts arise out of an
instant and overwhelming necessity, leaving no choice of means and no moment
of deliberation. See McHugh, Forcible Self-Help In International Law, 25 NAVAL
WAR COLLEGE REV. 61 (1972).
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against a protected category of persons; and (4) approval must
come from the highest levels of authority (United States poli-
cy). 159
Amending rules that pertain to the diplomatic bag will not
enhance the nationalistic right of self-defense, 0 but will only
serve to hinder diplomatic communications. The aggrieved state
need not rely on an international forum to formulate a re-
sponse; the necessary tools already rest in customary principles.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The United States, above all nations, must remember that
laws are made for general application and not for exceptions.
Sporadic abuses of the diplomatic bag must not be allowed to
cause abandonment of a longstanding and necessary tool, used
in performance of diplomatic relations and the carrying out of
other national interests. Freedom of communication remains a
cardinal principle in relations among nations which must be
preserved and safeguarded, notwithstanding occasional abuse.
At a minimum, the diplomatic bag must be protected under
current standards of sections (3) and (4) of article 27 of the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Proposals for
scanning, searching or detaining the diplomatic bag have been
rejected before by member states to the convention.' The
United States must lead the way to ensure that they are
rejected once more. At a time when the United Nations is
debating backing away from an inviolable status for the diplo-
matic bag, the United States must lead the way not only in
reaffirming the current rules, but also in establishing a
standard of complete inviolability.
There is great wisdom in the simple axiom that "one good
reason is always enough." In applying a cost-benefit analysis to
159. Dep't of Army, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE T 497
(July 1956).
160. A 'public safety" exception was briefly proposed by the State Department
in the aftermath of the search of the Nicaraguan Ambassador's residence by
American troops during the 1989-90 Panama Campaign. The proposal that there
was a customary exception to the Vienna Convention based on a public safety
theory was quickly discarded and the official U.S. position was based on a
mistake of fact concept. See G. Walsh, Executive Summary: Just Cause After-
Action Seminar, JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL 11 (1990).
161. E. DENZA, supra note 7, at 127.
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the diplomatic bag, that one good reason is the need for an
inviolable instrument with which to carry out foreign policy.
When the three alternatives offered by the International Law
Commission are considered against the critical importance that
the inviolable diplomatic bag has in enabling the United States
to carry out its diplomatic functions, the answer is fundamen-
tally obvious. Article 28 (alternative A) offers the greatest
advantage to the nation.
The United States response to abuse of the diplomatic bag
should rest in unilateral action based upon customary princi-
ples. Accordingly, the United States should formulate contingen-
cy plans based on this approach before the next serious abuse
is discovered. In order to avoid a situation like the British
reaction to the Libyan incident, it is critical to stand ready. If
necessary and appropriate responses are not created now, it is
certain that the issue of inviolability will remain, at best,
inexorably clouded.
